After recently having completed testing on a general method of discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis for estimating a broad basket of stocks’ intrinsic values, I became more concerned with “quality”. While DCFs remain the foundation of any sound business valuation, I discovered they are highly sensitive to the assumptions and data used. Slightly changing a minute detail can drastically influence the result causing an attractive investment to all of sudden seem not so attractive and vice versa. While relative valuation methods were a natural alternative (Wall Street’s preferred choice, in fact) to circumvent the sensitivity issues, I was inclined to believe that an ability to define robust ‘quality factors’ would complement the ideological purity of the discounted cash flow approach much better. The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate that a good company can indeed also be a good investment. Continue reading →
A lone Chinese female investor, Xingmei Zhong, d.b.a. Full Alliance International Ltd., finalized its plan to buyout all outstanding shares of YONG for $6.69 per share in cash. The deal is expected to close at the end of the first fiscal quarter of 2014 (i.e., between October and January). The buyout price reflects a 40% premium to YONG’s market price ($4.79) as of the date of the announcement on 12-Oct-2012.
At $6.25 per share, the buyout represent a 7.04% premium to market price. Investor’s looking for a relatively low-risk return on investment can engage in a risk-arbitrage trade. Investors can buy YONG now and will likely realize the differential between market and buyout price within 3 to 6 months. At the present, one could realize a 29.18% annualized return if the deal executes in 3 months; 14.20% if the deal executes in 6 months.
I have had several people already say to me that I am giving away too much information about how to profit in the market. If they mean that I have not been concise enough, duly noted. I must work on expressing myself more clearly.
If, on the other hand, they mean that I am giving away too much intellectual property without payment, then my response is that I have said nothing new. If sharing out the truth made it any less potent, then no one acting on publicly held information could conceivably earn returns above the amount of assumed risk. This is not true for the following reasons: Continue reading →
I used to think of myself as contrarian, but after completing my most recent research project, “Grading the Gurus” (which I presented at the last MBIIM) , I now realize that I only appear to be a contrarian. I’ll spare you the discourse on how I came to that for now, but I’ll make sure to include it in my closing remarks.
For those who were unable to join us last Sunday, I thought I would summarize the presentation and the following discussion. Without further ado…
INTRODUCTION TO ‘THE PROBLEM’
Like my previous post says, “I have often wondered if it makes any sense to pay attention to investing gurus.” And there certainly are a lot of them. Most of which seem to promise you that they’ve found the “secret” to easy money, whether that be a method of valuing companies or assessing the market’s future direction. However, evidence suggests otherwise as it has been proven that 85% of mutual funds have underperformed “dumb” index funds over the last 40 years. This means that all those fancy folks that went to fancy schools and wear fancy neckties are not as smart as “passive” investors. Therein lies the problem…
Sunday, August 4, 2013
10:00 AM to Cafe Lumiere
365 Calle Principal, Monterey, CA
Grading the Gurus I have often wondered if it makes any sense to pay attention to investing gurus. I’m talking about the greats; the legends; the Warren Buffets; The Benjamin Grahams; those with real followings, real track records, and, most importantly, real philosophies. In brief, I want to ask questions and query data in such a way that will help people place the “usual suspects” into one of three groups: