There are dozens of different mathematical constructions that yield bell-shaped curves. The “Hubbert” or “Peak Oil” curve is actually a special case of a class of s-shaped functions called sigmoids. While most sigmoid functions begin and end at different values, Hubbert’s curve is constrained to begin and end at zero by the formula and boundary conditions imposed that represent a perfect mathematical translation of Hubbert’s worldview. The curve reflects a battle between two competing forces or trends – one for growth and one for contraction – where the balance shifts between the two along the way. […]
One can (correctly) argue that the foundations of the modern scientific inquiry are built on the foundations of rational skepticism. Contrary to some beliefs, science cannot “prove” anything. Rather, it is premised on the “refutation” of untruth. By eliminating all other possible explanations, the scientific method thereby accepts a theory as “truth”. All fields of inquiry which purport themselves to be scientific, but for which no theory is refutable, are not science.
So, what should we make of climate “consensus” promoters who deny the irrefutably of specific, unproven theories? Does this not contradict the basis of rational skepticism? For example, Jim Hoggan (a lawyer) and Brendan DeMelle (a writer) have this to say about those who question the “consensus truth” regarding ACC:
Unfortunately, a well-funded and highly organized public relations campaign is poisoning the climate change debate. Using tricks and stunts that unsavory PR firms invented for the tobacco lobby, energy-industry contrarians are trying to confuse the public, to forestall individual and political actions that might cut into exorbitant coal, oil and gas industry profits. DeSmogBlog is here to cry foul – to shine the light on techniques and tactics that reflect badly on the PR industry and are, ultimately, bad for the planet.
Date of Source: 2016
Commodities trading – supply of the basic staples that are converted into the food we eat, the industrial goods we use, and the energy that fuels our transport and heats and lights our lives – is one of the oldest forms of economic activity, yet it is also one of the most widely misunderstood. At no time has this been truer than in the last 20 years, with the emergence of a group of specialist commodities trading and logistics firms operating in a wide range of complex markets […]
My intent is that this post become a living document which houses my own personal magnum opus on asset valuation. Herein and throughout I will posit certain axioms of asset valuation that I believe to be relevant for distinguishing between a thing’s market versus true value. Upon review, one might (correctly) deduce that none of these axioms are my original ideas.
Date of Source: 30 Oct 2016
ECONOMIC DECELERATION – AND HOW TO MEASURE IT One of the quirks of economics is that, within GDP (gross domestic product), all output is included, irrespective of what it really adds to prosperity. GDP, like Oscar Wilde’s cynic, knows “the price of everything, but the value of nothing”. If government paid 100,000 people to dig […]
Since late 2014, I’ve been trying to understand how to value upstream oil and gas companies in a way that anticipates future equity returns. Industry standard practices for financial modeling were illuminating, but they left me unconvinced that I could somehow out-compete smarter, more sophisticated, and better connected institutional investors at their own game. Moreover, nearly every time I tried to apply conventional (i.e., right-headed) valuation techniques to upstream companies, I came up with valuations that were either zero or far-below the current equity market capitalization. This suggested that some heavily discounted bonds would very likely repay par with interest. But seeing as I was full-time employed (and deployed) during those crazy times, I failed to act. Anyway, that boat has sailed…
Despite my lack of early success, I was driven on by a single premise: the lack of differentiation of upstream companies makes them incredibly easy to value once the initial learning curve has been surmounted.
- Equity investments into upstream oil and gas companies are largely levered commodity price plays; long-term total returns barely offset the carry costs of taking a long position in oil futures.
- There are multitudes of ways by which experts seek to forecast future commodities prices; most don’t work.
- The failure of forecasting should not be surprising if the Efficient Market Hypothesis is even partly correct.
- Even barring market efficiency, behavioral models provide ample reason for the widespread inaccuracy of forecasts.
- The idea that commodities prices — including oil — follow a random walk is both overwhelmingly supported by evidence and practical.
Figure 1: Black Gold
Source: Andy Thomas. Black Gold
Evidence overwhelmingly supports the notion that investments into upstream oil and gas producers are basically levered commodity price plays. This, and the fact that commodities producers are price-takers, indicates that petroleum economics are overly levered to commodities prices. It should follow, therefore, that an ability to accurately predict petroleum prices could result in advantageous market timing — i.e. investments in the right petroleum producing assets during the right times in the cycle. As a result of this ostensible potential for riches, prognosticators have devised multitudes of ways to forecast oil prices. Unfortunately, most of these efforts fall short of useful — no known forecasting approach, not even futures strip prices, significantly outperforms the assumption that price evolutions are random walks using out-of-sample data. This failure is not surprising, however, if we are to believe even a watered-down form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).
- Discount rates are a cornerstone of modern valuation methods for discounting the value of expected future cash flows.
- Upstream valuation professional systemically utilize elevated discount rates well in excess of rational expectations for long-run capital growth.
- The use of elevated discount rates may have roots in Modern Portfolio Theory, heuristics regarding the aggregation of well-level economics, and as proxies for high expected rates of depletion.
- Re-calibration of investors’ rational expectations indicates that lower discount rates may be more appropriate for evaluating long-run returns.
- Discount rates are simply a means by which to equate dollars in different time-periods — any further deliberation is likely to suffer from diminishing returns.
Figure 1: Sunburst – Pumping UntSource: Greg Evans. Sunburst – Pumping Unit. Art Gallery of Greg Evans
- Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI) is a popular metric for resource quality which attempts to cut through economic distortions caused by taxes, subsidies, and current market conditions.
- Energetic factors of resource intensity and efficiency also have practical applications for estimating long-term resource project economics.
- Declining EROEIs, which have been hyper-politicized by peak oil enthusiasts, have been counteracted by gains in full-cycle energy efficiencies.
- Though other energetic measures of return incorporate financial metrics, EROEI is still the purest key performance metric which exposes an energy resource’s underlying and long-term profit potential.
Source: Frank Reilly (Illustrator). Oilfield Worker. Liberty Magazine. 10 March 1945.
Date of Source: 12 Apr 2016
As quants, we’re all aware that every model has a shelf-life… a similar pattern applies to the world of data. Rare, unique and proprietary data eventually diffuses and becomes commonplace, easily available, edgeless data. The best analysts constantly reinvent their models, to avoid their inevitable obsolescence. Today, they’re venturing into the world of alternative data as a new source of alpha. […]